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∂AIL Prof. William Shockley↓McCullough 202↓Stanford, Calif.94305∞
Dear Professor Shockley:

	Thanks for the material you sent me.  I have read it,  and  I
have the following comments:

	1.  I presume that the newspaper reports that you are opposed
to equal opportunity are a misunderstanding of your position.  Anyway
my  own  view  is  that  equality  of opportunity to compete is right
regardless of whether one group may have lower averages than another,
but  it  is  wrong  to  demand  equality  of result and interpret any
inequality of result as a consequence of unfair discrimination.  Such
an interpretation requires that the extreme environmentalist position
be regarded as proved - not merely that the hereditarian position  be
regarded as unproved.

	In  my  opinion,  the potential for harm is great in that the
equalitarian  administrative  trends  may  blunt   the   desire   for
excellence in every area of human activity.

	It seems to me that if you agree with these points, you might
make them  explicitly  enough  to  reduce  the  probability  of  such
misinterpretations.

	2.  I  was  quite impressed with Urbach's article, especially
with the criteria for determining whether a  scientific  activity  is
degenerating  into  a  mere  search  for  possibilities  that admit a
preconceived  interpretation.  Some  amount  of   search   for   such
possibilities   seems   legitimate,  because  often  our  theoretical
intuitions are stronger than our experimental data,  but  Urbach  has
confirmed  my  belief that the environmentalists have gone far beyond
what is reasonable.

	3. It would be quite difficult  for  me  to  follow  all  the
details  of  the  controversies  over statistical methods, and I have
been   reduced   to   noticing   that   the   hypotheses   that   the
environmentalists advance seem ad hoc.  It occurred to me to consider
what the most extreme and experimentally irrefutable environmentalist
hypothesis  might  be,  and  the  best  I  could  come up with is the
following: "The  mere  knowledge  that  one  of  one's  most  obvious
characteristics  (i.e. skin color) is regarded as associated with low
intelligence by even a few people is  sufficient  to  produce  a  15 percent
reduction  in I.Q.". Note that this hypothesis has the virtue that it
justifies the actual suppression of hereditarian views.

	4. I agree substantially with the ethical arguments  in  your
paper,  but  I  would  like  to  make  a  quibble  about  the idea of
optimizing one's self-satisfaction in the last five minutes of  one's
rational  life.  It  seems  that  ∨ne should regard highly people who
behave in that way, but it seems doubtful that  one  should  identify
other  people's  welfare  with that criterion. Doing so might suggest
coercing other people excessively  for  their  own  moral  good.  One
should  have  a  certain  respect  for  what  other  people  actually
optimize. I  became  sensitive  to  this  issue  on  reading  Rawls's
%2Theory  of  Justice%1  in which he unjustifiably identifies justice
with making the  worst  off  as  well  off  as  possible,  but  never
discusses the justice of coercing people to behave justly.

	5.  I agree that the example of brain stimulation trivializes
some concepts of maximizing happiness,  but  I  am  not  prepared  to
conclude  that no posi←ive concept of social welfare is possible.  My
inclination is to give people good opportunities to strive  for  what
they  want without demanding that this meet my criterion of what they
ought to want.

	6. Your criterion for limiting the group  to  which  one  has
ethical  obligation  seems reasonable, but new cases such as actually
meeting non-hWman intelligences might require new thinking.  I  don't
think it is reasonable to try for a universal and perpetual rule. The
Polish science fiction writer  Lem,  in  %2The  Cyberiad%1,  which  I
heartily  recommend,  has  Klapaucius  berate  Trurl  for  creating a
miniature  electronic  world  in  whose  simulated  inhabitants   are
subjected  to  mistreatment by the human king for whom Trurl made the
world as a toy.

	7. There is another factor that  might  limit  the  range  of
moral  obligation  -  namely  sovereignty.   In  so  far  as  a group
separates itself from another and  assumes  the  separate  and  equal
station,  etc.,  it  takes  the  responsibility  for its own welfare.
Others must treat it fairly - in a sense that  I  cannot  now  define
precisely  - but are not responsible for its ultimate welfare or even
survival.  At present berserk humanitarian Americans  are  trying  to
assume  on behalf of all of us obligations to the population of India
and Bangladesh that the rest of us will never pay off  on.  This  has
the  negative  effect  that  politicians  in  those countries find it
easier to demonstrate their activity in demanding more  aid  than  to
tackle  their  country's  problems  directly.   In  this respect, the
current Indian hostility to the  U.S.  may  make  them  do  more  for
themselves than they would if  they  loved  us.  An  example  is  the
current  proposal  in  Punjab  for compulsory sterilization of people
with more than %2n%1 children where %2n%1 is not yet stated,  but  is
either  2 or 3.  This is more drastic than any well-meaning foreigner
would dare advocate.

	8.  This  has  some  application  to the position of American
blacks.  Suppose one of them believes  your  arguments.  He  has  two
choices:  1)  He  can  regard  himself as an individual American with
abilities in the general range and regard the fact that he is a black
as  no  more  significant  than  the  fact  that  he is a graduate of
Stanford.  2) He can regard himself  as  a  Black  and  obligated  to
advance  the  welfare  of  that  group.   To the extent that he takes
dysgenics seriously, he might try to get Blacks to go for  a  program
of genetic self improvement.

	Which  he  would  choose  depends  on  the extent to which he
regards himself as %2primarily%1 belonging to one group or the other.
On  the  one  hand,  the  red-haired are unlikely to form a group and
strive for self-improvement. On the other hand, if humanity  were  to
enunter  another  race  with  a  mean  I.Q.  of  150 and incapable or
unwilling to  interbreed  with  us,  we  would  almost  certainly  be
motivated  to  positive  eugenics.   If the I.Q. were 400, if that be
meaningful, our reaction is far from obvious.

	9. Finally, I regard the lack of  reproduction  by  the  very
intelligent  as  a  much  more  serious  problem  than  the excess of
reproduction by the stupid.  It seems to me that there is an absolute
shortage  of  intelligent  people.  Too  few of the important jobs in
business, government, and the academic world are occupied  by  people
competent to do them adequately.

	Therefore, I would recommend propaganda for people who regard
themselves as very intelligent to have as many children as  possible.
Just  this propaganda will be important, because too many intelligent
people believe that it is virtuous not to have children.  It is not a
question  of  outbreeding  the  stupid, but just that their should be
enough smart people to man  the  jobs.  I  would  also  welcome  your
support  of my earlier proposal to subsidize women of high attainment
to have children. Let me point out that something of  interest  could
be accomplished by a foundation of rather small resources.

	10.  I  shall conclude with a question.  I get the impression
that average I.Q. has appeared not to  decrease  as  rapidly  as  the
hereditarian view would predict given the correlations between social
class and intelligence and the correlations between social class  and
reproduction.  Might  not  one  explanation  be that within the lower
class, having a very  large  family  is  positively  correlated  with
ability,  because  it  is  difficult  to bring up a large family?  Of
course, the effect would disappear if humanitarianism  made  it  very
easy to bring up a large family.

	I  have written this detailed response to your ideas, because
I felt some obligation to encourage you in what must be an  extremely
lonely  struggle  to  force  the scientific community to behave in an
intellectually honest way. Incidentally, environmentalism is not  the
only  form  of  scientific  Lysenkoism  now prevalent.  Less virulent
perhaps, but still dangerous is the idea that any form of energy that
appeals  to  us  esthetically  can  be made practical by a sufficient
injection of money.  It is Lysenkoism in the sense of a  belief  that
politics   can   determine  the  facts  of  science  and  technology.
Incidentally again, I found Kusch's attempt to curry  favor  with  the
humanists  by separating science (good) from technology (evil) rather
depressing.

	I would not like this letter reprinted, because I would  want
to  strengthen  its  formulations  before  braving the criticism that
might come.  However, you may show it to people if it is of any  use,
and  I  plan eventually to publish something containing its content -
perhaps  in  my book on technology and the quality of life. I am also
open to other suggestions.

	What is your present situation with regard to having a  forum
for your ideas at Stanford?  In my opinion, the graduate special that
Moses denied was the correct forum, and at the  time  I  cancelled  a
class  in protest at his decision.  I am willing to stick my neck out
some to help you in this if you want it.
.REG